Book Review: John Marshall Harlan: Great Dissenter of the Warren Court. by Tinsley E. Yarbrough. by Parrish, Michael E.
University of Minnesota Law School
Scholarship Repository
Constitutional Commentary
1993
Book Review: John Marshall Harlan: Great
Dissenter of the Warren Court. by Tinsley E.
Yarbrough.
Michael E. Parrish
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/concomm
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Minnesota Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Constitutional
Commentary collection by an authorized administrator of the Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact lenzx009@umn.edu.
Recommended Citation
Parrish, Michael E., "Book Review: John Marshall Harlan: Great Dissenter of the Warren Court. by Tinsley E. Yarbrough." (1993).
Constitutional Commentary. 744.
https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/concomm/744
1993] BOOK REVIEWS 217 
rights programs, including preferences, that enabled him to reach or 
stay in the middle-class. Thus, affirmative action may in one sense 
be self-limiting. Its very success may be partially responsible for 
calls from within some quarters of the black community to limit it. 
This is not, however, a simple case either of majoritarian coop-
tion or of some victims pulling up the ladder before others have a 
chance to escape. It instead reflects the importance of economic 
status to self-definition in our culture. As Carter says: "The day is 
gone when large numbers of black students see themselves as the 
vanguard of a revolution; what students want now, and with reason, 
is a piece of the action. So do I." Perhaps one effect of the civil 
rights movement's success is the development of such class fissures 
within the African-American community. Carter's reflections, 
then, are ultimately not about affirmative action, but about what it 
means to be both black and traditionally successful in a world that 
still limits many blacks' chances of success. The book's importance, 
in other words, lies not in its arguments, but in its ambivalences. 
JOHN MARSHALL HARLAN: GREAT DISSENTER OF 
THE WARREN COURT. By Tinsley E. Yarbrough.! New 
York: Oxford University Press. 1992. Pp. xvi, 395. Cloth, 
$29.95. 
Michael E. Parrish 2 
As Earl Warren and his Court moved aggressively in the late 
1950s and early 1960s to eradicate racial segregation and to extend 
the Bill of Rights to the states, the first Justice John Marshall 
Harlan became a patron saint to Hugo Black, William 0. Douglas 
and other of its more liberal, activist members. The former slave 
owner from Kentucky, mocked by Justice Holmes as "my lion-
hearted friend," had dissented in The Civil Rights Cases,3 Plessy v. 
Ferguson,4 Hurtado v. Ca/ifornia,s and Twining v. New Jersey,6 all of 
which established his claim to being the jurisprudential progenitor 
of those who battled to expunge racism from the Constitution and 
to incorporate the Bill of Rights into the guarantees of the Four-
teenth Amendment. 
I. Professor of Political Science, East Carolina University. 
2. Professor of History, University of California, San Diego. 
3. 109 u.s. 3 (1883). 
4. 163 u.s. 537 (1896). 
5. 110 u.s. 516 (1884). 
6. 211 u.s. 78 (1908). 
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The first Harlan's burgeoning reputation for liberalism did not 
go unchallenged, however. Holmes' own progeny, Felix Frank-
furter, often on the defensive during the early Warren years, re-
minded the second Justice John Marshall Harlan that his 
grandfather had written for a unanimous Court in 1899 when the 
Justices refused to block a Georgia school board from closing an all-
black high school while continuing to operate similar institutions 
for white students. 1 Whether to test his own doubts about the 
Brown decision or simply to needle his junior colleague, Frankfurter 
pursued the issue relentlessly for several weeks. "I submit that any 
judge who thought that the Constitution, as a legal proposition, is 
color blind, would at least have been able to reach the lawyer-like 
result . . . in not leaving colored high school children out in the 
cold," he concluded. With good reason, Harlan II remained unper-
suaded by Frankfurter's analysis of Cumming and convinced that 
his grandfather would have ruled against racially segregated public 
schools had a later case presented that issue.s 
For their part, those who placed Harlan I on a liberal pedestal 
in the 1960s seldom recalled that he wrote for the majority in Adair 
v. United States,9 where the Justices struck down on "freedom of 
contract" grounds an act of Congress that had attempted to end the 
union-busting practice of yellow-dog contracts on the nation's rail-
roads. How the jurist who dissented in Lochner and wrote a sweep-
ing opinion that affirmed a broad commerce power for Congress10 
could have also penned Adair has baffied legal scholars for a long 
time. Harlan I, it seems, was a man of contradictions. 
So, too, was his namesake and grandson, a Rhodes Scholar and 
a high-priced Wall Street lawyer, who was named to the high court 
by Eisenhower in 1955 and served until1971. Often bracketed with 
Frankfurter and Potter Stewart as one of the Warren Court's fre-
quent nay-sayers, Harlan II is most frequently remembered for re-
sisting the application of the Bill of Rights to the states, rejecting 
court-ordered reapportionment, opposing the Miranda warnings, 11 
and backing the Nixon administration in the Pentagon Papers 
7. Cumming v. Richmond County Bd. of Educ., 175 U.S. 528 (1899). 
8. Frankfurter conveniently ignored Harlan I's passionate dissent in Berea College v. 
Commonwealth of Kentucky, 211 U.S. 45, 67 (1908) where the majority, including Holmes, 
sustained a state law prohibiting racial integration in private schools. "I am of opinion," 
Harlan wrote, "that in its essential parts the statute is an arbitrary invasion of the rights of 
liberty and property guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment against hostile state action 
and is, therefore, void." 
9. 208 u.s. 161 (1908). 
10. Champion v. Ames, 188 U.S. 321 (1903). 
II. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
1993] BOOK REVIEWS 219 
case.l2 
But Harlan II has enjoyed a major renaissance of late that 
should receive yet another boost with the publication of Tinsley 
Yarbrough's fine biography. This past June, when the Supreme 
Court largely reaffirmed the right to abortion in Planned 
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,D the five-Justice 
majority rested its constitutional arguments squarely upon Harlan 
II's broad conception of the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process 
Clause which he set forth first in dissent in Poe v. Ullman 14 and 
later restated when concurring in Griswold v. Connecticut. Is How 
Harlan II would have voted in Roe v. Wade 16 or Casey must remain 
as shrouded in mystery as his grandfather's views on segregated 
public schools, but it can be argued persuasively that by utilizing his 
approach to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment in 
Casey, the majority placed abortion rights on a firmer constitutional 
foundation than ever before.l7 
Yarbrough, whose previous books examined the judicial ca-
reers of J. Waties Waring, Hugo Black and Frank Johnson, has 
written a sympathetic yet critical interpretation of the Justice most 
often associated with the conservative wing of the Warren Court, a 
spokesman for judicial restraint in an age of activism, a Frank-
furter, some wag observed, without the mustard. Such a characteri-
zation is probably unfair to Harlan, who certainly lacked the latter's 
combative personality and acerbic wit, but whose judicial impact 
may prove to be more durable for those very same reasons. 
Utilizing all the extant judicial papers from the period and 
drawing upon extensive interviews with Harlan's former clerks and 
associates, Yarbrough's study ranks among the best biographical 
works covering the Warren years. Avoiding tedious chronology, 
his wise selection of particular cases highlight Harlan's central val-
ues without drowning the reader in a swamp of detail. The Harlan 
who emerges was a very intelligent, kindly, well-intentioned man, 
but one who exhibited all the cultural and political limitations of his 
social class. When he was good, as in Poe v. Ullman or Griswold, he 
could be very, very good. But when he was bad, as in Flemming, Is 
12. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971). 
13. 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2804-08 (1992). 
14. 367 u.s. 497 (1961). 
15. 381 u.s. 479 (1965). 
16. 410 u.s. 113 (1973). 
17. See Ronald Dworkin, "The Center Holds," The New York Review of Books, August 
13, 1992, 29-33. 
18. 363 U.S. 603, 617, 638 (1960). Harlan provided the fifth vote and wrote for the 
majority in upholding the termination of social security benefits to an alien who had been 
deported from the United States for membership in the Communist Party during the 1930s. 
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he could be horrid. 
Frankfurter, the immigrant lad who made good, often gave of-
fense to allies and adversaries alike. Harlan II seldom did. He was 
the very model of the American patrician-raised in genteel com-
fort, educated at prep schools, Princeton and Oxford, polite, well 
mannered, well tailored, in short, a gentleman who appears to have 
been taught from the cradle that people of his background were 
destined to rule the nation's politics and legal system. 
In this respect Harlan II came from a long line of patrician 
judicial forbearers-Joseph Story, who agonized over the evils of 
slavery, but sustained the Fugitive Slave Act; Oliver Wendell 
Holmes, who relished the clash of ideas, but helped put Debs in 
prison; Charles Evans Hughes, who deplored debt peonage, but 
fought the economic reforms of the New Deal. The most recent 
incarnation of this social type appears to have been Lewis Franklin 
Powell, Jr., the courtly Virginian, who fought segregation and cast 
crucial votes on abortion and affirmative action, but placed consen-
sual homosexual relations beyond the pale of constitutionally pro-
tected liberty and dismissed statistical arguments showing gross 
racial disparities in the imposition of capital punishment. t9 
The patrician as jurist deplores anti-radical witch-hunts led by 
the hoi polloi that threaten to undermine the efficacy of more gen-
teel forms of repression. He defends privacy, especially when linked 
to the conventional, heterosexual pleasures of his social class. He 
seldom votes to disturb the existing distribution of property and 
political relations. That, in a nutshell, was Harlan II, the Justice 
who helped inter the Smith Act in Yates v. United States,zo but sent 
Junius Scales to jail a few years later under the same statute.zt 
In addition to Poe v. Ullman and Griswold, Harlan II raised 
Justice Brennan's dissent branded the Jaw and the termination a bill of attainder through 
which Congress sought to punish "aliens deported for conduct displeasing to the lawmakers." 
Harlan argued that judicial inquiries into legislative motives were "at best a hazardous mat· 
ter, and when that inquiry seeks to go behind objective manifestations it becomes a dubious 
affair indeed." 
19. On Powell see especially his votes in Keyes v. Denver School Dist. No. I, 413 U.S. 
189 (1973); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); University of California Regents v. Bakke, 438 
U.S. 265 (1978); Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986); and McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 
279 (1987). 
20. 354 u.s. 298 (1957). 
21. Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203 (1961). Harlan voted to restrict the scope of 
congressional anticommunist inquiries in Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178 (1957), but 
two years later eviscerated that ruling in Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109 (1959). He 
wrote for the 5-4 majority that sustained the registration provisions of the McCarren Act and 
in favor of New York's broad anticommunist loyalty oath requirement for public school 
teachers. See Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 367 U.S. 1 (1961) and 
Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967). 
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high the banner of privacy in Roth,22 a major obscenity decision of 
the Warren years, and Chime/ v. Califomia,23 which narrowed the 
limits of warrantless searches incident to an arrest. But he reso-
lutely opposed the reapportionment revolution and was the lone dis-
senter in Flast v. Cohen,24 where the Justices modified standing 
requirements and broadened the opportunities for taxpayers to con-
test government programs. He seldom appears to have met a mo-
nopolistic business corporation he didn't like.2s 
A lawyer's lawyer, it was appropriate that Harlan filled the 
seat occupied by Robert Jackson, another first-class advocate, litiga-
tor, and process-oriented jurist, whose occasional eloquence on be-
half of freedom of speech and liberty was exceeded only by his belief 
in conspiracies and his passion for order.26 But from the perspec-
tive of 1992 and the present Supreme Court, now packed with polit-
ical lackeys and intellectual harlots, even Jackson and Harlan have 
taken on the stature of devoted civil libertarians. One can only 
hope and pray that the Casey five continue to read the Harlan of 
Griswold and not the Harlan of Flemming. 
THE CONSTITUTION IN CONFLICT. By Robert A. 
Burt.I Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. 1992. 
Pp. 454. $29.95. 
Michael Stokes Paulsen 2 
I 
The Constitution in Conflict is a disappointingly weak book 
about a powerful and important idea in constitutional law. The 
22. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957). 
23. 395 u.s. 752 (1969). 
24. 392 u.s. 83 (1968). 
25. Harlan's principal clients at Root, Clark, Buckner & Howland prior to his judicial 
appointments had included American Telephone and Telegraph, Western Electric, Interna-
tional Telephone and Telegraph, the Gillette Safety Rawr Company, American Optical and 
DuPont. He represented the latter in their unsuccessful effort to maintain a dominant finan-
cial interest in General Motors, and when the Supreme Court finally sustained the govern-
ment's Clayton Act complaint, he recused himself, but later denounced Justice Brennan's 
opinion for its "superficial understanding of a really impressive record." The record, of 
course, had been one he helped to prepare at Root, Clark. 
26. Compare Jackson in West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943), 
with Jackson in Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943), or Kunz v. New York, 340 
u.s. 290 (1951). 
I. Southmayd Professor of Law, Yale University. 
2. Associate Professor of Law, University of Minnesota Law School. My thanks to 
Michael Socarras, Ron Wright and Chip Lupu for their helpful comments. 
